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GRADIENT-FREE ONLINE LEARNING IN GAMES WITH DELAYED REWARDS
AMÉLIE HÉLIOU∗, PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS⋄,∗,c, AND ZHENGYUAN ZHOU♯
Abstract. Motivated by applications to online advertising and recommender systems,
we consider a game-theoretic model with delayed rewards and asynchronous, payoff-based
feedback. In contrast to previous work on delayed multi-armed bandits, we focus on multi-
player games with continuous action spaces, and we examine the long-run behavior of
strategic agents that follow a no-regret learning policy (but are otherwise oblivious to
the game being played, the objectives of their opponents, etc.). To account for the lack
of a consistent stream of information (for instance, rewards can arrive out of order, with
an a priori unbounded delay, etc.), we introduce a gradient-free learning policy where
payoff information is placed in a priority queue as it arrives. In this general context,
we derive new bounds for the agents’ regret; furthermore, under a standard diagonal
concavity assumption, we show that the induced sequence of play converges to Nash
equilibrium (NE) with probability 1, even if the delay between choosing an action and
receiving the corresponding reward is unbounded.
1. Introduction
A major challenge in the application of learning theory to online advertising and recom-
mender systems is that there is often a significant delay between action and reaction: for
instance, a click on an ad can be observed within seconds of the ad being displayed, but
the corresponding sale can take hours or days to occur – if it occurs at all. Putting aside
all questions of causality and “what if” reasoning (e.g., the attribution of the sale to a given
click), this delay has an adverse effect on all levels of the characterization between marketing
actions and a user’s decisions.
Similar issues also arise in operations research, online machine learning, and other fields
where online decision-making is the norm; as an example, we mention here the case of traffic
allocation and online path planning, signal coveriance optimization in signal processing, etc.
In view of all this, a key question that arises is a) to quantify the impact of a delayed
reward / feedback structure on multi-agent learning; and b) to design policies that exploit
obsolete information in a way as to minimize said impact.
Context. In this paper, we examine the above questions in the general framework of online
learning in games with continuous action spaces. In more detail, we focus on recurrent
decision processes that unfold as follows: At each stage t = 1, 2, . . . , the decision-maker
(or player) selects an action Xt from a set of possible actions X . This action subsequently
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triggers a reward ut(Xt) based on some (a priori unknown) payoff function ut : X → R.
However, in contrast to the standard online optimization setting, this reward is only received
by the player dt stages later, i.e., at round t + dt. As a result, the player may receive no
information at round t, or they may receive older, obsolete information from some previous
round s < t.
This very broad framework places no assumptions on the governing dynamics between
actions and rewards, the payoff-generating process, or the delays encountered by the player.
As such, the most common performance measure for a realized sequence of actions is the
player’s regret, i.e., the difference between the player’s cumulative payoff over a given horizon
and that of the best fixed action in hindsight. Thus, in the absence of more refined knowledge
about the environments, the most sensible choice would be to deploy a policy which, at the
very least, leads to no regret.
A specific instance of this “agnostic” framework – and one that has attracted considerable
interest in the literature – is when the rewards of a given player are determined by the
player’s interactions with other players, even though the dynamics of these interactions can
be unknown to the decision-making players beforehand. For instance, when placing a bid
for reserving ad space, the ultimate payoff of a bidder will be determined by the bids of all
other participating players and the rules of the underlying auction. The exact details of the
auction (e.g., its reserve price) may be unknown to the bidders, and the bidders may not
know anything about whom they are bidding against, but their rewards are still determined
by a fixed mechanism – that of an N -player game.
With all this in mind, our paper focuses on the following questions that arise naturally
in this context: Is there a policy leading to no regret in online optimization problems with
delayed, payoff-based feedback? And, assuming all players subscribe to such a policy, does
the induced sequence of play converge to a stable, equilibrium state?
Our contributions. Our first contribution is to design a policy for online learning in this
setting, which we call gradient-free online learning with delayed feedback (GOLD). The
backbone of this policy is the online gradient descent (OGD) algorithm of Zinkevich (2003),
but with two important modifications designed to address the challenges of the current
setting. The first modification is the inclusion of a zeroth-order gradient estimator based on
the simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) mechanism of Spall (1997)
and Flaxman et al. (2005). By virtue of this stochastic approximation mechanism, the player
can estimate – albeit in a biased way – the gradient of their payoff function by receiving
the reward of a nearby, perturbed action. The second element of GOLD is the design of
a novel information pooling strategy that records information in a priority queue as they
arrive, and subsequently dequeues them following a first-in, first-out (FIFO) scheme. The
main challenge that occurs here is that the stream of information received by an agent
may be highly unbalanced, e.g., consisting of intermittent batches of obsolete information
followed by periods of feedback silence. This suggests that an agent should exercise a certain
“economy of actions” and refrain from burning through batches of received information too
quickly; the proposed pooling policy achieves precisely this by dequeueing at most one bit
of feedback, even if more is available at any given stage.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the principal difficulty that arises is how to fuse these two
components and control the errors that accrue over time from the use of obsolete – and biased
– gradient estimates. This requires a delicate shadowing analysis and a careful tweaking of
the method’s parameters – specifically, its step-size sequence and the query radius of the
SPSA estimator. In so doing, our first theoretical result is that GOLD guarantees no regret,
even if the delays encountered by the agent are unbounded. Specifically, if the reward of the
t-th round is received up to o(tα) rounds later, then the GOLD algorithm enjoys a regret
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bound of the form O(T 3/4 + T 2/3+α/3). In particular, this means that GOLD guarantees
no regret even under unbounded delays that might grow over time at a sublinear rate.
Our third contribution is to derive the game-theoretic implications of concurrently run-
ning GOLD in a multi-agent setting. A priori, the link between no regret and Nash equilib-
rium (as opposed to coarse correlated equilibrium) is quite weak. Nevertheless, if the game
in question satisfies a standard monotonicity condition due to Rosen (1965), we show that
the sequence of actions generated by the GOLD policy converges to Nash equilibrium with
probability 1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first Nash equilibrium convergence
result for game-theoretic learning with delayed, payoff-based feedback.
Related work. The no-regret properties of OGD in settings with delayed feedback was re-
cently considered by Quanrud and Khashabi (2015) who proposed a natural extension of
OGD where the player performs a batched gradient update the moment gradients are re-
ceived. Doing so, Quanrud and Khashabi (2015) showed that if the total delay over a
horizon T is DT =
∑T
t=1 dt, OGD enjoys a regret bound of the form O(
√
T +DT ). This
bound echoes a string of results obtained in the multi-armed bandit (MAB) literature under
different assumptions: for instance, Joulani et al. (2013) and Vernade et al. (2017) assume
that the origin of the information is known; Quanrud and Khashabi (2015) and Pike-Burke
et al. (2018) do not make this assumption and instead consider an “anonymized” feedback
enviroment; etc.
When the action space is finite, online learning with delayed feedback has also been
explored in the context of adversarial MABs. In this context, Thune et al. (2019) bound
the regret in this case with the cumulative delay, which, in our notation, would be O(T 1+α).
Taking into account the non-square-root scaling of the regret due to the lack of gradient
observations, this would conceivably lead to a bound similar to that of Theorem 1 for a
MAB setting. Related papers which provide adaptive tuning to the unknown sum of delays
are the works of Joulani et al. (2016), Zimmert and Seldin (2020), while Bistritz et al. (2019)
and (Zhou et al., 2019) provide further results in adversarial and linear contextual bandits
respectively. However, the algorithms used in these works have little to do with OGD.
Likewise, no-regret learning in bandit convex optimization has a long history dating back
at least to Kleinberg (2004) and Flaxman et al. (2005). The standard OGD policy with SPSA
gradient estimates achieves an O(T 3/4) regret bound, and the T 3/4 term in our bound is
indeed related to this estimate. Using sophisticated kernel estimation techniques, Bubeck
and Eldan (2016, 2017) decreased this bound to O(T 1/2), suggesting an interesting interplay
with our work. However, very little is known when the learner has to cope simultaneously
with delayed and payoff-based feedback.
In the MAB setting, the work of Joulani et al. (2013) provides an answer for mixed-
strategy learning over finite-action spaces, but the online convex optimization case is com-
pletely different. In particular, a major difficulty that arises is that the batch update ap-
proach of Quanrud and Khashabi (2015) cannot be easily applied with stochastic estimates
of the received gradient information (or when attempting to infer such information from re-
alized payoffs). This issue was highlighted in the work of Zhou et al. (2017a) who employed
a batching strategy similar to that of Quanrud and Khashabi (2015) in a game-theoretic
context with perfect gradient information. Because of this, online learning in the presence
of delayed reward/feedback structures requires new tools and techniques.
On the game theory side, Krichene et al. (2015) and Balandat et al. (2016) studied the
Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in specific classes of contin-
uous games (zero-sum and potential games). The work of Mertikopoulos and Zhou (2019)
and its follow-ups (Lin et al., 2020, Zhou et al., 2017b, 2018, 2020) provided an extension to
the class of monotone games with varying degrees of generality; however, all these works rely
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the delayed feedback framework considered in
the paper. Arrows illustrate the round to which the payoff is deferred.
on the availability of gradients in the learning process. In sharp contrast to this, Bervoets
et al. (2018) recently considered payoff-based learning in games with one-dimensional action
sets, and they established convergence to Nash equilibrium under a synchronous, two-point,
“sample-then-play” bandit strategy. More recently, Bravo et al. (2018) showed that no-regret
learning with payoff-based feedback converges to Nash equilibrium in strongly monotone
games, but it is assumed that actions are synchronized across players and rewards are as-
sumed to arrive instantaneously. A model of learning with delays was provided by Zhou et al.
(2017a) but their analysis and learning strategy only applies to perfect gradient information:
the case of noisy – or, worse, payoff-based – delayed feedback was stated in that paper as a
challenging open issue. Our paper settles this open question in the affirmative.
2. The model
2.1. The general framework. The general online optimization framework that we consider
can be represented as the following sequence of events (presented for the moment from the
viewpoint of a single, focal agent):
• At each stage t = 1, 2, . . . , of the process, the agent picks an action Xt from a
compact convex subset X of a n-dimensional real space Rn.
• The choice of action generates a reward uˆt = ut(Xt) based on a concave function
ut : X → R (assumed unknown to the player at stage t).
• Simultaneously, Xt triggers a delay dt ≥ 0 which determines the round t + dt at
which the generated reward uˆt will be received.
• The agent receives the rewards from all previous rounds Rt = {s : s+ ds = t}, and
the process repeats.
The above model has been stated in an abstract way that focuses on a single agent so as
to provide the basis for the analysis to come. The setting where there are no assumptions
on the process generating the agent’s payoff functions will be referred to as the unilateral
setting; by contrast, in the multi-agent, game-theoretic setting, the payoff functions of the
focal agent will be determined by the stream of actions of the other players (see below for
the details). In the latter case, all variables other than the running counter t will be indexed
by i to indicate their dependence on the i-th player; for example, the action space of the
i-th player will be written X i, the corresponding action chosen by at stage t will be denoted
X it , etc. For concreteness, we provide a diagrammatic illustration in Fig. 1 above.
In both cases, our blanket assumptions for the stream of payoffs and the delays encoun-
tered by the players will be as follows:
Assumption 1. For each t = 1, 2, . . . , ut is concave in x, V∗-Lipschitz continuous, and β-
Lipschitz smooth. Specifically, the gradient Vt(x) ≡ ∇xut(x) of ut is bounded by V∗ and
satisfies ‖Vt(x˜)− Vt(x)‖ ≤ β‖x˜− x‖ for all x, x˜ ∈ X .
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Assumption 2. The delays dt grow asymptotically as dt = o(t
α) for some α < 1.
Regarding the delay assumption above, large-scale analytic studies have shown that long
delays are observed in practice: in a study by Chapelle (2014) with data from the real-time
bidding company Criteo, it was found that more than 10% of the conversions were more
than two weeks old. Moreover, the conclusion of the same study was that the distribution
of delays in online advertising can be fitted reasonably well by long-tailed distributions,
especially when conditioning on context and feature variables available to the advertiser,
thus justifying the assumption of a possibly unbounded delay between choosing an action
and receiving a reward. We also note here that we are making no further assumptions on
the way the sequence of delays is generated: conceivably, delays could even be determined
adversarially, as in Quanrud and Khashabi (2015).
2.2. Multi-agent considerations. For the multi-agent case, suppose there is a finite set of
playersN = {1, . . . , N}, each with their own action space X i ⊆ Rni (always assumed convex
and compact). In this case, it will be convenient to encode the players’ joint action profile
x = (xi)i∈N ∈ X ≡
∏
i∈N X i by means of the shorthand (xi;x−i) ≡ (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN )
which highlights the action xi ∈ X i of the i-th player against the action profile x−i ∈ X−i ≡∏
j 6=i X j of i’s opponents. The payoff to each player i ∈ N for a given action profile x ∈ X
will then be determined by an associated payoff (or utility) function ui : X → R, assumed
here and throughout to be concave in the action variable xi of the player in question. We
will refer to the tuple G ≡ G(N ,X , u) as an N -player continuous game (Debreu, 1952,
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Rosen, 1965).
In this context, if Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t ) ∈ X is a sequence of joint actions, the payoff
function encountered by the i-th player at stage t will be given by
uit(x
i) ≡ ui(xi;X−it ) for all xi ∈ X i, (1)
leading to the gradient expression
V it (x
i) ≡ ∇xiuit(xi;X−it ) = V i(xi;X−it ) (2)
where
V i(x) = ∇xiui(xi;x−i). (3)
denotes the individual payoff gradient of the i-th player at the action profile x ∈ X . In the
rest of our paper, we will assume that ui is Lipschitz continuous and Lipschitz smooth, so
Assumption 1 is satisfied by default in this case.
2.3. Regret and equilibrium. With these preliminaries at hand, our principal performance
indicators will be the minimization of regret and the notion of a Nash equilibrium. Starting
with the former, the regret of an agent in the unilateral setting is defined over a horizon of
T stages as
Reg(T ) = max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
[ut(x) − ut(Xt)]. (4)
and, in the presence of randomness, we similarly introduce the agent’s mean (or pseudo-)
regret as
Reg(T ) = max
x∈X
E[
T∑
t=1
[ut(x) − ut(Xt)]]. (5)
Accordingly, we will say that a sequence of actions Xt ∈ X , t = 1, 2, . . . , leads to no regret
if Reg(T ) = o(T ).
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On the other hand, the notion of a Nash equilibrium (NE) is a purely game-theoretic
concept which characterizes those action profiles that are resilient to unilateral deviations.
In more detail, we say that x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of G when
ui(x∗) ≥ ui(xi;x−i∗ ) (NE)
for all xi ∈ X i and all i ∈ N . In full generality, the relation between Nash equilibria and
regret minimization is feeble at best: if all players play a Nash equilibrium for all t = 1, 2, . . . ,
they will trivially have no regret; the converse however fails by a longshot, see e.g., Viossat
and Zapechelnyuk (2013) and references therein.1
In the game-theoretic literature, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points has been
mainly studied under a condition known as diagonal strict concavity (DSC) (Rosen, 1965),
which we define here as: ∑
i∈N
λi〈V i(x˜)− V x(x), x˜i − xi〉 < 0 (DSC)
for some λi > 0 and all x, x˜ ∈ X with x˜ 6= x.
In optimization, this condition is known as monotonicity (Bauschke and Combettes,
2017), so we will interchange the terms “diagonally strictly concave” and “monotone”for
games that satisfy (DSC). Under (DSC), Rosen (1965) showed the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium; this is of particular importance to online advertising because of the fol-
lowing auction mechanism that can be seen as a monotone game:
Example 2.1 (Kelly auctions). Consider a provider with a splittable commodity (such as
advertising time or website traffic to which a given banner will be displayed). Any fraction
of this commodity can be auctioned off to a set of N bidders (players) who can place
monetary bids xi ≥ 0 up to each player’s total budget bi to acquire it. Once all players
have placed their respective bids, the commodity is split among the bidders proportionally
to each player’s bid; specifically, the i-th player gets a fraction ρi = xi
/
(c +
∑
j∈N xj) of
the auctioned commodity (where c ≥ 0 is an “entry barrier” for bidding on the resource). A
simple model for the utility of player i is then given by the Kelly auction mechanism (Kelly
et al., 1998):
ui(xi;x−i) = giρi − xi, (6)
where gi represents the marginal gain of player i from a unit of the commodity. Using
standard arguments, it is easy to show that the resulting game satisfies (DSC), see e.g.,
Goodman (1980).
Other example of games satisfying (DSC) are (strictly) convex-concave zero-sum games
(Juditsky et al., 2011), routing games (Nisan et al., 2007), Cournot oligopolies (Mertikopou-
los and Zhou, 2019), power control (Mertikopoulos et al., 2017, Scutari et al., 2010), etc. For
an extensive discussion of monotonicity in game theory, see Facchinei and Kanzow (2007),
Laraki et al. (2019), Pang et al. (2010), Sandholm (2015) and references therein. In the rest
of our paper, we will assume that all games under consideration satisfy (DSC).
3. The GOLD algorithm
We are now in a position to state the proposed gradient-free online learning with delayed
feedback (GOLD) method. As the name suggests, the method concurrently addresses the two
aspects of the online learning framework presented in the previous section, namely the delays
encountered and the lack of gradient information. We describe each component in detail
1Specifically, Viossat and Zapechelnyuk (2013) show that ther are games whose set of coarse correlated
equilibria contain strategies that assign positive probability only to strictly dominated strategies.
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Algorithm 1: gradient-free online learning with delayed feedback (GOLD) [focal player view]
Require: step-size γt > 0, sampling radius δt > 0, safety set Br(p) ⊆ X
1: choose X1 ∈ X ; set P0 ← ∅, uˆ∞ = 0, Z∞ = 0 # initialization
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
3: draw Zt uniformly from S
n
# perturbation direction
4: set Wt ← Zt − (Xt − p)/r # feasibility adjustment
5: play Xˆt ← Xt + δtWt # player chooses action
6: generate payoff uˆt = u(Xˆt) # associated payoff
7: trigger delay dt # delay for payoff
8: collect rewards Rt = {s : s+ ds = t} # receive past payoffs
9: update pool Pt ← Pt−1 ∪ Rt # enqueue received info
10: take qt = minPt; set Pt ← Pt\{qt} # dequeue oldest info
11: set Vˆt ← (n/δqt)uˆqt Zqt # estimate gradient
12: update Xt+1 ← Π(Xt + γtVˆt) # update pivot
13: end for
below, and we provide a pseudocode implementation of the method as Algorithm 1 above;
for convenience and notational clarity, we take the viewpoint of a focal agent throughout,
and we do not carry the player index i.
3.1. Delays. To describe the way that the proposed method tackles delays, it is convenient
to decouple the two issues mentioned above and instead assume that, at time t, along with
the generated rewards uˆs for s ∈ Rt = {s : s + ds = t}, the agent also receives perfect
gradient information for the corresponding rounds, i.e., gets to observe Vs(Xs) for s ∈ Rt.
We stress here that this assumption is only made to illustrate the way that the algorithm
is handling delays, and will be dropped in the sequel.
With this in mind, the first thing to note is that the set of information received at a given
round might be empty, i.e., we could have Rt = ∅ for some t. To address this sporadic
shortage of information, we introduce a pooling strategy, not unlike the one considered by
Joulani et al. (2013) in the context of multi-armed bandit problems. Specifically, we assume
that, as information is received over time, the agent adds it to an information pool Pt, and
then uses the oldest information available in the pool (where “oldest” refers to the time at
which the information was generated).
Specifically, starting at t = 0 with an empty pool P0 = ∅ (since there is no information at
the beginning of the game), the agent’s information pool is updated following the recursive
rule
Pt = Pt−1 ∪Rt \ {qt} (7)
where
qt = min(Pt−1 ∪Rt) (8)
denotes the oldest round from which the agent has unused information at round t. Heuris-
tically, this scheme can be seen as a priority queue in which data Vs(Xs), s ∈ Rt, arrives
at time t and is assigned priority s (i.e., the round from which the data originated); sub-
sequently, gradient data is dequeued one at a time, in ascending priority order (i.e., oldest
information is utilized first).
In view of the above, if we let Vˆt = Vqt(Xqt) denote the gradient information dequeued
at round t, we will use the basic gradient update
Xt+1 = Π(Xt + γtVˆt), (9)
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where γt > 0 is a variable step-size sequence (discussed extensively in the sequel), and
Π(y) = argminx∈X ‖x − y‖ denotes the Euclidean projection to the agent’s action space
X . Of course, an important issue that arises in the update step (7) is that, despite the
parsimonious use of gradient information, it may well happen that the agent’s information
pool Pt is empty at time t (e.g., if at time t = 1, we have d1 > 0). In this case, following
the standard convention inf ∅ = ∞, we set qt = ∞ (since it is impossible to ever have
information about the stage t = ∞), and, by convention, we also set V∞ = 0. Under this
convention, (9) can be written in more explicit form as
Xt+1 = Π(Xt + γt 1Pt 6=∅ Vˆt)
=
{
Xt if Pt = ∅,
Π(Xt + γtVˆt) otherwise.
(10)
In this way, the gradient update (9) can be seen as a delayed variant of Zinkevich’s on-
line gradient descent policy; however, in contrast to “batching-type” policies (Quanrud and
Khashabi, 2015, Zhou et al., 2017a), there is no gradient aggregation: received gradients are
introduced in the algorithm one at a time, oldest information first.
3.2. Payoff-based gradient estimation. We now proceed to describe the process with which
the agent infers gradient information from the received rewards. To that end, following
Spall (1997) and Flaxman et al. (2005), we will use a one-point, simultaneous perturbation
stochastic approximation (SPSA) approach that was also recently employed by Bravo et al.
(2018) for game-theoretic learning with bandit feedback (but no delays or asynchronicities).
In our delayed reward setting (and always from the viewpoint of a single, focal agent), this
process can be described as follows:
(1) Pick a pivot state Xt to estimate its payoff gradient.
(2) Pick a sampling radius δt > 0 (detailed below) and draw a random sampling direc-
tion Zt from the unit sphere S
n.
(3) Introduce an adjustment Wt to Zt to ensure feasibility of the sampled action
Xˆt = Xt + δtWt (11)
(4) Generate the reward uˆt = ut(Xˆt) and estimate the gradient of ut at Xt as
∇ˆt = n
δt
uˆtZt (12)
More precisely, the feasibility adjustment mentioned above is a skewing operation of the
form
Wt = Zt − r−1(Xt − p) (13)
where p ∈ X and r > 0 are such that the radius-r ball Br(p) has Br(p) ⊆ X , ensuring in this
way that Xˆt ∈ X whenever Xt ∈ X ; for more details, see Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012).
3.3. Learning with delayed, payoff-based feedback. Of course, the main problem in the
SPSA estimator (12) lies in the fact that, in a delayed reward structure, the payoff generated
at time t would only be observed at stage t+ dt. With this in mind, we make the following
bare-bones assumptions:
• Expectations are taken relative to the inherent randomness in the sampling direction
Zt.
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• The agent retains in memory the chosen sampling direction Zs for all s ≤ t that
have not yet been utilized, i.e., for all s ∈ Ut ≡ {1, . . . , t} \ {qℓ : ℓ = 1, . . . , t}.2
In this way, to combine the two frameworks described above (delays and bandit feedback),
we will employ the gradient estimator
Vˆt = 1Pt 6=∅ ∇ˆqt =
n
δqt
uˆqt Zqt (14)
with the convention uˆ∞ = 0, Z∞ = 0 if qt = ∞ – i.e., if the player’s information pool Pt
is empty at stage t. Thus, putting everything together, we obtain the gradient-free online
learning with delayed feedback (GOLD) policy:
Xˆt = Xt + δtWt
Xt+1 = Π(Xt + γtVˆt)
(GOLD)
with Wt and Vˆt given by Eqs. (13) and (14) respectively (for a pseudocode implementation
of the policy, see Algorithm 1). We will examine the learning properties of this policy in
the next section.
4. Analysis and guarantees
4.1. Statement and discussion of main results. We are now in a position to state and prove
our main results for the GOLD algorithm under Assumptions 1 and 2. We begin with the
algorithm’s regret guarantees in the unilateral setting:
Theorem 1. Suppose that an agent is running (GOLD) with step-size and sampling radius
sequences of the form γt = γ/t
c and δt = δ/t
b for some γ, δ > 0 and b = min{1/4, 1/3−α/3},
c = max{3/4, 2/3+ α/3}. Then, the agent enjoys the mean regret bound
Reg(T ) = O˜(T 3/4 + T 2/3+α/3). (15)
Remark. In the above, O˜(·) stands for “O(·) up to logarithmic factors”. The actual mul-
tiplicative constants that are hidden in the Landau “big oh” notation have a complicated
dependence on the diameter of X , the dimension of the ambient space, the range of the
players’ utility functions; we provide more details on this in the paper’s appendix.
For the game-theoretic setting, we will focus on games satisfying Rosen’s diagonal strict
concavity condition (e.g., as the Kelly auction example described in Section 2). In this
general context, we have:
Theorem 2. Let G be a continuous game satisfying (DSC), and suppose that each agent
follows (GOLD) with step-size and sampling radius sequences γt = γ/t
c and δt = δ/t
b for
some γ, δ > 0 and b, c satisfying the conditions:
2c− b > 1 + α, (16a)
b+ c > 1, (16b)
2c− 2b > 1. (16c)
Then, with probability 1, the sequence of play Xˆt induced by (GOLD) converges to the game’s
(necessarily) unique Nash equilibrium.
2In the appendix, we show that |Ut| ≤ max1≤s≤t ds, so this requirement is fairly mild (linear) relative to
the delays, especially when the delay distribution is exponential – e.g., as in the online advertising study of
Chapelle (2014).
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b
c
α = 1
α = 1
2
α = 1
4
α = 0
b
≤
2c
−
1
−
α
3
4
1
1
Figure 2: The allowable region (green shaded areas) of possible values of the
sampling radius and step-size exponents b and c for various values of the groth
exponent α of the encountered delays. The dashed blue lines corresponding to
the last two terms in (16) indicate hard boundaries leading to logarithmic terms
in the regret instead of constants.
The above results are our main guarantees for (GOLD) so, before discussing their proof,
some remarks are in order. The first concerns the tuning of the algorithm’s hyperparameters,
i.e., the exponents b and c. Even though the conditions stated in Theorem 1 may appear
overly precise, we should note that agents have considerably more leeway at their disposal.
Specifically, as part of the proof, we show that any choice of the exponents b and c satisfying
(16) also leads to no regret – albeit possibly at a worse rate. This is particularly important
for the interplay between no regret and convergence to Nash equilibrium because it shows
that the two guarantees are fairly well aligned as long as (GOLD) is the class of no-regret
policies under consideration.
We should also note here that the T 3/4 term is the standad regret bound that one obtains
in the bandit online convex optimization framework. On the other hand, the term T 2/3+α/3
describes the advent of the delays which, combined with the bias of the SPSA gradient
estimator, contribute a significant amount of regret over time (recall in particular that dt is
a priori unbounded). This is of particular importance to applications to online advertising
where delays can often become arbitrarily large.
For concreteness, we also plot in Fig. 2 the region of allowed step-size and sampling
radius exponents. This plot reveals the interesting property that, if the feedback delays do
not grow too large over time – specifically, if dt = o(t
1/4) – then they have no impact on
the allowable choices of b and c. This is also reflected in the regret bound (15) where, for
α = 1/4, the regret-specific term becomes T 3/4 as well; in particular, in the constant regret
case dt = O(1), the delays are invisible in (15). These considerations illustrate the impact
of each source of feedback scarcity (bandit vs. delays) on the performance of (GOLD) and
provides a clear insight on the different mechanisms affecting the algorithm’s regret and
convergence guarantees.
4.2. Analysis and sketch of proof. The rest of this section is devoted to a high-level sketch of
the proof of Theorems 1 and 2. We begin by decomposing Vˆt as a noisy estimate of V (Xqt)
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into the following elements:
Vˆt = V (Xqt) + Uqt+1 + bqt . (17)
The various terms in (17) above are defined as follows:
(1) First, we set
Uqt+1 = Vˆt − E[Vˆt | Ft] (18)
where the filtration Ft contains all the random variables that have been realized at
the beginning of the t-th iteration of the algorithm; more precisely, we let
Ft = σ(∅, X1, . . . , uˆqt−1 , Zt−1, Xt) (19)
with the convention uˆ∞ = 0, Z∞ = 0 if qt =∞. We note for posterity that Uqt is a
martingale difference sequence relative to Ft, i.e., E[Uqt+1 | Ft] = 0.
(2) Second, we let
bqt = E[Vˆt | Ft]− V (Xqt) (20)
denote the systematic error of the estimator Vˆt relative to the gradient of the de-
queued state Xqt (i.e., the error remaining after any zero-sum component has been
averaged out). In contrast to U , this term is not zero-mean; instead, as we discuss
in the appendix, the SPSA gradient estimation process that we employ induces a
bias of order ‖bqt‖ = O(δqt). This bias term grows smaller with t but its variance
increases, leading to a bias-variance trade-off in our setting.
With all this in hand, the workhorse of our calculations is the distance of the sequence
Xt to a given “benchmark” action p ∈ X (the best fixed action in hindsight, or the game’s
equilibrium, depending on the context). Specifically, letting
Dt =
1
2
‖Xt − p‖2 (21)
we have the following template inequality:
Lemma 1. If (GOLD) is run with assumptions as above, then, for all p ∈ X , we have
Dt+1 ≤ Dt + γt〈V (Xqt), Xt − p〉 (22a)
+ γt〈Uqt+1, Xt − p〉 (22b)
+ γt〈bqt , Xt − p〉 (22c)
+ 1
2
γ2t ‖Vˆt‖2 (22d)
This lemma follows from the decomposition (17), the nonexpansivity of the projection
mapping, and the regularity assumption (1) which allows us to control the terms (22a) and
(22c) above; to streamline our discussion, we defer the details to the paper’s supplement.
Moving forward, with this estimate at our disposal, the analysis branches for Theorems 1
and 2 as indicated below.
Regret analysis. To bound the agent’s regret, we need to isolate the scalar product in (22a)
and telescope through t = 1, 2, . . . , T after dividing by the step-size γt. Deferring the ensuing
lengthy calculations to the appendix, we ultimately obtain a bound of the form
Reg(T ) = O
(
1
γT
T∑
t=1
(
γt
t−1∑
s=qt
γs
δs
+ γtδqt +
γ2t
δ2qt
))
(23)
As a result, to proceed, we need to provide a specific bound for each of the above summands.
The difficulty here is the mixing of different quantities at different time-stamps, e.g., as in
the product term γtδqt . Bounding these terms requires a delicate analysis of the delay terms
in order to estimate the maximum distance between t and qt. We will return to this point
12 A. HÉLIOU, P. MERTIKOPOULOS, AND Z. ZHOU
below; for now, with some hindsight, we only stress that the terms in (23) correspond on a
one-to-one basis with the conditions (16) for the parameters of (GOLD).
Game-theoretic analysis. The game-theoretic analysis is significantly more involved and re-
lies on a two-pronged approach:
(1) We first employ a version of the Robbins–Siegmund theorem to show that the ran-
dom variable Dt = (1/2)‖Xt − x∗‖2 converges pointwise as t → ∞ to a random
variable D∞ that is bounded in expectation (here x∗ denotes the game’s unique
equilibrium).
(2) Subsequently, we use a series of probabilistic arguments (more precisely, a law of
large numbers for martingale difference sequences and Doob’s submartingale con-
vergence theorem) to show that (GOLD) admits a (possibly random) subsequence
Xts converging to x∗.
Once these two distinct elements have been obtained, we can readily deduce that Xt → x∗
with probability 1 as t → ∞. Hence, given that ‖Xt − Xˆt‖ = O(δt) and limt δt = 0, our
claim would follow.
However, applying the probabilistic arguments outlined above requires in turn a series of
summability conditions. Referring to the paper’s supplement for the details, these require-
ments boil down to showing that the sequences
At = γt
t−1∑
s=qt
γs
δs
, Bt = γtδqt , and Ct =
γ2t
δ2qt
, (24)
are all summable. Importantly, each of these three sums has a clear and concise interpreta-
tion in our learning context:
(1) The first term (At) is the cumulative error induced by using outdated information.
(2) The second term (Bt) is the error propagated from the bias of the SPSA estimator.
(3) Finally, the third term (Ct) corresponds to the variance (or, rather, the mean square)
of the SPSA estimator.
As a result, as long as these terms are all summable, their impact on the learning process
should be relatively small (if not outright negligible).
Comparing the above term-by-term to (23) is where the game-theoretic analysis rejoins
the regret analysis. As we said above, this requires a careful treatment of the delay process,
which we outline below.
Delay analysis. A key difficulty in bounding the sums in (23) is that the first term (At in
(24) is a sum of t− qt terms, so it can grow quite rapidly in principle. However, our pooling
strategy guarantees that t − qt cannot grow faster than the delay (which is sublinear by
assumption). This observation (detailed in the supplement) guarantees the convergence of
the sum. A further hidden feature of (22) is in the noise term Ut: in the case of batching or
reweighted strategies (e.g., as in Zhou et al., 2017a), this term incorporates a sum of terms
arriving from different stages of the process, making it very difficult (if not impossible) to
control. By contrast, the pooling strategy that defines the GOLD policy allows us to treat
this as an additional “noise” variable; we achieve this by carefully choosing the step-size and
sampling radius parameters based on the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Suppose that (GOLD) is run with step-size and sampling radius parameters of
the form γt ∝ γ/tc and δt ∝ δ/tb, with b, c > 0. Then:
(1) If 2c− b ≥ 1 + α, then ∑Tt=1At = O(logT ); in addition, if the inequality is strict,
At is summable.
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(2) If c+ b ≥ 1, then ∑Tt=1 Bt = O(logT ); in addition, if the inequality is strict, Bt is
summable.
(3) If 2c− 2b ≥ 1, then ∑Tt=1 Ct = O(log T ); in addition, if the inequality is strict, Ct
is summable.
Proving this lemma requires a series of intermediate results that we defer to the paper’s
supplement.
5. Concluding remarks
Our aim in this paper was to examine the properties of bandit online learning in games
with continuous action spaces and a delayed reward structure (with a priori unbounded
delays). The proposed GOLD policy is the first in the literature to simultaneously achieve
no regret and convergence to Nash equilibrium with delayed rewards and bandit feedback.
From a regret perspective, it matches the standard O(T 3/4) bound of Flaxman et al. (2005)
if the delay process is tame (specifically, if dt grows no faster than o(t
1/4)); in addition,
from game-theoretic standpoint, it converges to equilibrium with probability 1 in all games
satisfying Rosen’s DSC condition.
One important direction for future research concerns the case of anonymous – i.e., not
time-stamped – rewards. This complicates the matters considerably because it is no longer
possible to match a received reward to an action; as a result, the GOLD policy would have
to be redesigned from the ground up in this context. Another important avenue is that
the kernel-based estimation techniques of Bubeck and Eldan (2016, 2017) achieve a faster
O(T 1/2) regret minimization rate with bandit feedback; whether this is still achievable with
a delayed reward structure, and whether this can also lead to fast(er) convergence to Nash
equilibrium is another direction for future research.
Appendix A. Auxiliary results
In this appendix, we collect some basic results for the SPSA gradient estimator and
the gradient update step in (GOLD). We begin by establishing the template inequality of
Lemma 1 which, for convenience, we restate below:
Lemma 1. If (GOLD) is run with assumptions as above, then, for all p ∈ X , we have
Dt+1 ≤ Dt + γt〈V (Xqt), Xt − p〉 (22a)
+ γt〈Uqt+1, Xt − p〉 (22b)
+ γt〈bqt , Xt − p〉 (22c)
+ 1
2
γ2t ‖Vˆt‖2 (22d)
Proof. We begin by recalling the decomposition of Vˆt as
Vˆt = V (Xqt) + Uqt+1 + bqt . (17)
where:
(1) the noise process Uqt+1 = Vˆt−E[Vˆt | Ft] is a zero-mean process when conditioned on
the filtration Ft = σ(∅, X1, . . . , uˆqt−1 , Zt−1, Xt) that contains all random variables
that have been realized at the beginning of the t-th iteration of the algorithm.
(2) bqt = E[Vˆt | Ft] − V (Xqt) denotes the systematic (non-zero-mean) error of the esti-
mator Vˆt relative to the gradient of the dequeued state Xt.
We note for posterity that Uqt is a martingale difference sequence relative to Ft, i.e.,
E[Uqt+1 | Ft] = 0. We also note here that, when the pool is empty, there is no update
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so Xt+1 = Xt. Then, for any p ∈ X and for all t = 1, 2, . . . T for which an update occurs,
we have
‖Xt+1 − p‖2 = ‖Π(Xt + γtVˆt)− p‖2
= ‖Π(Xt + γtVˆt)−Π(p)‖2
≤ ‖Xt + γtVˆt − p‖2
≤ ‖Xt − p‖2 + 2γt〈Vˆt, Xt − p〉+ γ2t ‖Vˆt‖2
= ‖Xt − p‖2 + 2γt〈V (Xqt) + Uqt+1 + bqt , Xt − p〉+ γ2t ‖Vˆt‖2
= ‖Xt − p‖2 + 2γt〈V (Xt), Xt − p〉
+ 2γt〈Uqt+1, Xt − p〉+ 2γt〈bqt , Xt − p〉+ γ2t ‖Vˆt‖2. (A.1)
Our claim then follows by recalling that Dt = (1/2)‖Xt − p‖2. 
Coupled with Lemma 1, the decomposition (17) will allow us to control the distance to
a chosen bencmark action p by properly bounding each of the summands of (22). To that
end, we provide below a series of estimates for each of these terms:
Lemma A.1. Let ξqt+1 = 〈Uqt+1, Xt − p〉. Then:
E[ξqt+1] = 0 for all t = 1, 2, . . . (A.2)
Proof. By the law of total expectation, we have:
E[ξqt+1] = E[〈Uqt+1, Xt − p〉]
= E[E[〈Uqt+1, Xt − p〉 | Ft]] = E[〈E[Uqt+1 | Ft], Xt − p〉] = 0 (A.3)
where the last step follows from the fact that E[Uqt+1 | Ft] = E[Vˆt − E[Vˆt | Ft] | Ft] = 0. 
Lemma A.2. Let rqt = 〈bqt , Xt − p〉. Then, there exists a positive constant R > 0 such that:
|rqt | ≤ Rδqt for all t = 1, 2, . . . (A.4)
Proof. In this result, the role of the choices of other players plays an important role, so we will
momentarily reinstate the player superscript. However, to keep the notation manageable,
we will tacitly assume that all players trigger the same delay process so qit = q
j
t for all
i, j ∈ N ; the proof is exactly the same in the general case.
To begin, by the definition (14) of Vˆt and the independence of the sampling directions Z
i
s
across players i ∈ N and stages s = 1, 2, . . . t, we have
E[Vˆ it | Ft] =
ni/δqt∏
j vol(S
j)
∫
S1
· · ·
∫
SN
ui(X1qt + δqtz
1, . . . , XNqt + δqtz
N)zi dz1 · · · dzN
=
ni/δqt∏
j vol(δqtS
j)
∫
δqtS
1
· · ·
∫
δqtS
N
ui(X1qt + z
1, . . . , XNqt + z
N )
zi
‖zi‖ dz
1 · · · dzN
=
ni/δqt∏
j vol(δqtS
j)
∫
δqtS
i
∫
∏
j 6=i δqtS
j
ui(X iqt + z
i;X−iqt + z
−i)
zi
‖zi‖ dz
i dz−i
=
ni/δqt∏
j vol(δqtS
j)
∫
δqtB
i
∫
∏
j 6=i δqtS
j
∇iui(X iqt + wi;X−iqt + z−i) dwi dz−i, (A.5)
where, in the last line, we used Stokes’ theorem (Lee, 2003) to write∫
δqtS
i
ui(X iqt + z
i;X−iqt + z
−i)
zi
‖zi‖ dz
i =
∫
δqtB
i
∇iui(X iqt + wi;X−iqt + z−i) dwi. (A.6)
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Since vol(δqtB
i) = (δqt/n
i) vol(δqtS
i), the above yields
E[Vˆ it | Ft] = ∇iuiδqt (X
i
qt ;X
−i
qt ) (A.7)
where the “δ-smoothed” payoff function uiδ of player i is defined as
uiδ(x
i;x−i) =
1
vol(δBi)
∏
j 6=i vol(δSj)
∫
δBi
∫
∏
j 6=i δS
j
ui(xi +wi;x−i + z−i) dz1 · · · dwi · · · dzN
(A.8)
We now proceed to show that maxx∈X‖∇iuiδ(x)−∇iui(x)‖ = O(δ). Indeed, by Assump-
tion 1, we have ‖V i(x˜) − V i(x˜)‖ ≤ β‖x˜ − x‖ for all x, x˜ ∈ X . Hence, for wi ∈ δBi and all
zj ∈ δSj , j 6= i, we obtain:
‖∇iui(xi + wi;x−i + z−i)−∇iui(xi;x−i)‖ ≤ β
√
‖wi‖2 +
∑
j 6=i
‖zj‖2 ≤ βδ
√
N. (A.9)
Thus, by differentiating under the integral sign in the definition (A.8) of uiδ, we get:
‖∇iuiδ(x) −∇iui(x)‖ =
1
vol(δBi)
∏
j 6=i vol(δSj)
×
∥∥∥∥∥
∫
δBi
∫
∏
j 6=i δS
j
∇iui(xi + wi;x−i + z−i)−∇iui(xi;x−i) dz1 · · · dwi · · · dzN
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
vol(δBi)
∏
j 6=i vol(δSj)
×
∫
δBi
∫
∏
j 6=i δS
j
∥∥∇iui(xi + wi;x−i + z−i)−∇iui(xi;x−i)∥∥ dz1 · · · dwi · · · dzN
≤
√
Nβδ. (A.10)
With all this in hand, we finally get:
|riqt | ≤ ‖biqt‖‖X it − pi‖
≤ diam(X i)‖E[Vˆ it | Ft]− V (X iqt)‖ = diam(X i)‖∇iuiδqt (X
i
qt)−∇iui(Xqt)‖
≤ diam(X i)
√
Nβδqt , (A.11)
and our proof is complete. 
Finally, for the last term in the template inequality (22), we have:
Lemma A.3. Let ψ2t =
1
2
‖Vˆt‖2. Then, there exists a positive constant V∗ > 0 such that:
E[ψ2t | Ft] ≤
V 2∗
2δ2qt
for all t = 1, 2, . . . (A.12)
Proof. By the definition (14) of Vˆt, we have:
E[ψ2t | Ft] =
1
2
n2
δ2qt
E[uˆ2qt‖Zqt‖2 | Ft] ≤
V 2∗
2δ2qt
(A.13)
where V 2∗ = n
2maxx∈X |u(x)| and we used the fact that ‖Zt‖ = 1 (by construction). 
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Appendix B. Properties of the pooling strategy
In this section we prove some key properties of the information queueing/dequeing strat-
egy that is employed by the GOLD algorithm. This strategy allows the players to receive
rewards and thus to update their strategies reasonably often (cf. Lemma B.1), while en-
suring that rewards do not stay in the unused pool any longer than absolutely necessary
(Lemma B.2). We make these statements precise belo:
Lemma B.1. The maximal number of steps with an empty pool (no update) is bounded by
the maximal delay encountered up to the stage in question; formally:
#{s : Ps = ∅, s = 1, 2, . . . t} ≤ max1≤s≤t(ds) for all t = 1, 2, . . . (B.1)
Proof. We begin by analyzing the constant delay case, i.e., when dt = D for all s = 1, 2, . . . t.
In that case, the first D steps have no update; subsequently, at each stage, the agent receives
payoff information with delay D.
Now assume that ds, s = 1, 2, . . . t, is a given sequence of delays. We will show that if
we modify a term of this sequence to d˜s < ds, the number of steps without an update will
remain the same or decrease by one. Indeed, given that the reward of the s-th stage is now
collected at stage d˜s + s instead of the (later) stage ds + s, the size of the pool Pd˜s+s will
be increased by 1. In turn, this provides an update to the next step without an update
(which could be d˜s + s). Thus, if the next step without an update was before time t, the
number of steps without an update decreases by one, otherwise it remains unchanged. This
means that the maximal number of steps without an update is reached when the delay is
constant and is equal to said delay. Our claim then follows immediately (see also Fig. 3 for
a graphical illustration of this argument). 
We now proceed to bound the difference between the time that an information is used
and the time it was generated:
Lemma B.2. The time lag t − qt between the step when a reward is observed and the step
when the action was taken is bounded from above by the maximal delay up to step t; formally:
t− qt ≤ max1≤s≤t ds for all t = 1, 2, . . . (B.2)
Proof. We proceed by induction. Since at first the pool is empty, one of the rewards arriving
in the first non-empty R is used, so t− qt = dqt ≤ max
s≤t
(ds) in this case.
For the inductive step, assume that t− qt ≤ max
s≤t
(ds) for some t ≥ 1; we prove below that
this is also the case when t← t+ 1. In that case, Pt+1 ← Pt ∪Rt+1 and qt+1 = min(Pt+1)
so min(Rt+1) ≥ t+ 1− max
s≤t+1
(ds). In addition, at the t-th step, the oldest element of Pt is
removed from the pool and utilized. As a result, we have
minPt > t−max1≤s≤t ds ≥ t+ 1−max1≤s≤t+1 ds (B.3)
This gives qt+1 ≥ t+ 1−max1≤s≤t+1 ds and completes the induction (and our proof). 
Our next lemma goes a step further and shows that, under our blanket assumptions, the
lag t− qt is small relative to t:
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 2, we have t − qt = o(tα); in particular, t − qt = o(t) and
qt = Θ(t) .
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma B.2 and Assumption 2. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of the number of steps without an update if one of the delays
encountered is reduced. The case presented is when the number of steps without
an update decreases. Here the delay of step 1 decreases from 3 to 1, and, as a
consequence, step 3 has an update that it previously did not have (changes in the
information pool and its head are higlighted in bold).
We proceed with the proof of Lemma 2 which establishes the required control on the
sequences
At = γt
t−1∑
s=qt
γs
δs
, Bt = γtδqt , and Ct =
γ2t
δ2qt
, (24)
that couple the encountered delays with the step-size and sampling policies of (GOLD). For
convenience, we restate Lemma 2 below:
Lemma 2. Suppose that (GOLD) is run with step-size and sampling radius parameters of
the form γt ∝ γ/tc and δt ∝ δ/tb, with b, c > 0. Then:
(1) If 2c− b ≥ 1 + α, then ∑Tt=1At = O(logT ); in addition, if the inequality is strict,
At is summable.
(2) If c+ b ≥ 1, then ∑Tt=1 Bt = O(logT ); in addition, if the inequality is strict, Bt is
summable.
(3) If 2c− 2b ≥ 1, then ∑Tt=1 Ct = O(log T ); in addition, if the inequality is strict, Ct
is summable.
Remark. For clarity, the conditions on b, c and α are summarized in Fig. 4 below.
Proof. We proceed step-by-step.
(1) For the series
∑T
t=1At, Corollary 1 guarantees the existence of some M such that
t − qt ≤ Mtα ≤ Mt. We also have that 1/sb ∝ δs ≤ δqs ∝ 1/qbs = Θ(1/sb) so
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Figure 4: The allowable region (green shaded areas) of possible values of the
sampling radius and step-size exponents b and c for various values of the groth
exponent α of the encountered delays. The dashed blue lines corresponding to
the last two terms in (16) indicate hard boundaries leading to logarithmic terms
in the regret instead of constants.
δqs = Θ(1/s
b). In turn, this gives
At = γt
t−1∑
s=qt
γs
δs
≤ γt(t− qt) γt
δqt
≤Mγttα γt
δqt
= Θ
(
1
t2c−α−b
)
. (B.4)
We conclude that
∑∞
t=1At is finite if 2c − α − b > 1 and
∑T
t=1At = O(logT ) if
2c− α− b = 1; this establishes our claim for At.
(2) For the series
∑T
t=1Bt, invoking again Corollary 1 and arguing as above, we readily
get γtδqt = O(1/tb+c). Hence, the condition c+b > 1 is sufficient for the convergence
of the infinite series to a finite number, whereas, in the case c + b = 1, we have∑T
t=1Bt = O(logT ).
(3) Finally, for the series
∑T
t=1 Ct =
∑T
t=1 γ
2
t /δ
2
qt , invoking Corollary 1 one last time
and using the fact that δqt = O(1/tb), we obtain γ2t /δ2qt = Θ(t2b/t2c). Therefore,
the condition 2c− 2b > 1 is sufficient for the convergence of the infinite series to a
finite number, whereas, in the case 2c− 2b = 1, we have∑Tt=1 Ct = O(logT ). 
Appendix C. Regret analysis
We are now in a position to prove the main regret guarantee of the GOLD policy; for
convenience, we restate it below:
Theorem 1. Suppose that an agent is running (GOLD) with step-size and sampling radius
sequences of the form γt = γ/t
c and δt = δ/t
b for some γ, δ > 0 and b = min{1/4, 1/3−α/3},
c = max{3/4, 2/3+ α/3}. Then, the agent enjoys the mean regret bound
Reg(T ) = O˜(T 3/4 + T 2/3+α/3). (15)
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Proof. Fix a benchmark action x ∈ X . Then, for all stages t = 1, 2, . . . T at which an update
occurs, Lemma 1 gives
γt〈V (Xt), x−Xt〉 ≤ 1
2
‖Xt − x‖2 − 1
2
‖x−Xt+1‖2
+ γt
t−1∑
s=qt
〈V (Xs)− V (Xs+1), Xt − x〉
+ γtξqt+1 + γtrqt + γ
2
t ψ
2
t (C.1)
where, the quantities ξqt+1, rqt and ψ
2
t are defined as in Lemmas A.1–A.3 respectively, and,
in the second line, we unfolded the pairing 〈V (Xqt), Xt − x〉 as
〈V (Xqt), Xt − x〉 = 〈V (Xqt)− V (Xqt+1), Xt − x〉 + · · ·+ 〈V (Xt), Xt − x〉
= 〈V (Xt), Xt − x〉+
t−1∑
s=qt
〈V (Xs)− V (Xs+1), Xt − x〉. (C.2)
Therefore, conditioning on Ft and taking expectations, we get the bound:
γt〈V (Xt), x−Xt〉 = γt E[〈V (Xt), x−Xt〉 | Ft]
≤ 1
2
‖x−Xt‖2 − 1
2
E[‖x−Xt+1‖2 | Ft] (C.3a)
+ γt E
[
t−1∑
s=qt
〈V (Xs)− V (Xs+1), Xt − x〉
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(C.3b)
+ γt E[ξqt+1 | Ft] + γt E[rqt | Ft] + γ2t E[ψ2t | Ft], (C.3c)
where, in the first line, we used the fact that Xt is Ft-measurable.
We proceed term-by-term. First, for (C.3b), since Xs is Ft-measurable for s ≤ t, we get:
E
[
t−1∑
s=qt
〈V (Xs)− V (Xs+1), Xt − x〉
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
t−1∑
s=qt
〈V (Xs)− V (Xs+1), Xt − x〉 {measurability}
≤
t−1∑
s=qt
‖V (Xs)− V (Xs+1)‖ · ‖Xt − x‖ {Cauchy-Schwarz}
≤ β diam(X )
t−1∑
s=qt
‖Xs −Xs+1‖ {Lipschitz + compactness}
≤ β diam(X )
t−1∑
s=qt
‖γsVˆs‖ {non-expansivity of Π}
= β diam(X )
t−1∑
s=qt
γs
n
δqs
uˆqs {SPSA estimator}
≤ K
t−1∑
s=qt
γs
δs
{decreasing δt}
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where we set K = nβ diam(X )maxx∈X |u(x)|. Moreover, by invoking Lemmas A.1–A.3, the
term (C.3c) becomes
γt E[ξqt+1 | Ft] + γt E[rqt | Ft] + γ2t E[ψ2t | Ft] ≤ 0 +Rγtδqt +
V 2∗
2
γ2t
δ2qt
, (C.4)
with V 2∗ = n
2maxx∈X |x(x)| as in the proof of Lemma A.3. Thus, putting everything
together, and recalling that ut is assumed concave, we get
ut(x)− ut(Xt) ≤ 〈V (Xt), x−Xt〉 ≤ ‖Xt − x‖
2 − E[‖Xt+1 − x‖2 | Ft]
2γt
+
1
γt
[
Kγt
t−1∑
s=qt
γs
δs
+Rγtδqt +
V 2∗
2
γ2t
δ2qt
]
(C.5)
Now, using Lemma 2 and the fact that γt is decreasing, a summation of the above yields:
T∑
t=1
1{Pt 6=∅}[u(x)− u(Xt)] ≤
T∑
t=1
‖Xt − x‖2 − E[‖Xt+1 − x‖2 | Ft]
2γt
+
1
γT
T∑
t=1
1{Pt 6=∅}
[
KAt +RBt +
V 2∗
2
Ct
]
=
T∑
t=1
‖Xt − x‖2 − E[‖Xt+1 − x‖2 | Ft]
2γt
+ O˜
(
1
γT
)
=
‖X1 − x‖2
2γ1
− E[‖Xt+1 − x‖
2 | FT ]
2γT
+
T∑
t=2
[
‖x−Xt‖2
2γt
− E[‖x−Xt‖
2 | Ft−1]
2γt−1
]
+ O˜
(
1
γT
)
.
(C.6)
Then, by taking expectations and letting D¯t = (1/2)E[‖Xt − x‖2], we get:
E
[
T∑
t=1
1{Pt 6=∅}[u(x)− u(Xt))]
]
≤ D¯1
γ1
− D¯T+1
γT
+
T∑
t=2
[
1
γt
− 1
γt−1
]
D¯t + O˜
(
1
γT
)
≤ diam(X )
2
2γ1
+
diam(X )2
2
T∑
t=2
[
1
γt
− 1
γt−1
]
+ O˜
(
1
γT
)
=
diam(X )2
2γT
+ O˜
(
1
γT
)
= O˜
(
1
γT
)
. (C.7)
Recall now that the number of steps without an update is o(Tα) by Lemmas B.1 and B.2.
We thus conclude that:
E
[
T∑
t=1
[u(x)− u(Xt))]
]
= O˜
(
1
γT
+ Tα
)
= O˜(Tα + T c). (C.8)
Using Fig. 4 as a visual aid, we see that the smallest admissible value of c is 3
4
if α ≤ 1
4
,
or 2
3
+ α
3
otherwise – i.e., the intersection of the lines b = 2c − 1 − α and b = 1 − c. In
addition, c ≥ 2
3
+ α
3
> α because α < 1. Therefore, by choosing c = max(3
4
, 2
3
+ α
3
) and
GRADIENT-FREE ONLINE LEARNING IN GAMES WITH DELAYED REWARDS 21
b = min(1
4
, 1
3
− α
3
) to minimize the term Tα + T c, we conclude that
Reg(T ) = E
[
T∑
t=1
(u(x)− u(Xt))
]
= O˜(T c) = O˜(T 3/4 + T 2/3+α/3). (C.9)
Consequently, the O˜(T 3/4) bandit bound is achieved for c = 3
4
, b = 1
4
and α ≤ 1
4
. 
Appendix D. Convergence to Nash equilibrium
We now proceed to prove Theorem 2 on the convergence to Nash equilibrium. For con-
venience, we restate our result below:
Theorem 2. Let G be a continuous game satisfying (DSC), and suppose that each agent
follows (GOLD) with step-size and sampling radius sequences γt = γ/t
c and δt = δ/t
b for
some γ, δ > 0 and b, c satisfying the conditions:
2c− b > 1 + α, (16a)
b+ c > 1, (16b)
2c− 2b > 1. (16c)
Then, with probability 1, the sequence of play Xˆt induced by (GOLD) converges to the game’s
(necessarily) unique Nash equilibrium.
To streamline our presentation, we divide the proof of Theorem 2 in two parts: First, we
show that the distance between Xt and the game’s (necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium x∗
admits a well-defined limit with probability 1; subsequently, we extract a subsequence of Xt
that converges to x∗. Proving these two results would imply that the limit of the distance
of Xt to equilibrium is necessarily zero (with probability 1). We make this approach precise
below:
Proposition D.1. Suppose that G satisfies (DSC) and let x∗ be its (necessarily unique) Nash
equilibrium. Then, with assumptions as in Theorem 2, the limit limt→∞‖Xt − x∗‖ exists
and is finite with probability 1.
Proof. By (DSC), we have
〈V (x), x − x∗〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X , (D.1)
with equality holding if and only if x = x∗. Then, proceeding as in the proof of the no-regret
bound of Theorem 1 and rearranging the RHS of (C.5), we obtain
1
2
E[‖Xt+1 − x∗‖2 | Ft] ≤ 1
2
‖Xt − x∗‖2 +
[
KAt +RBt +
V 2∗
2
Ct
]
· 1Pt 6=∅ (D.2)
with K and R positive constants, and At, Bt and Ct defined in Eq. (24).
To proceed, note that
∞∑
s=t
[
KAs +RBs +
V 2∗
2
Cs
]
· 1{Ps 6=∅} ≤
∞∑
s=t
[
KAs +RBs +
V 2∗
2
Cs
]
<∞ (D.3)
by Lemma 2. Thus, if we let
St =
1
2
‖Xt − x∗‖2 +
∞∑
s=t
[
KAs +RBs +
V 2∗
2
Cs
]
1{Ps 6=∅}, (D.4)
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the bound (D.2) yields
E[St+1 | Ft] = 1
2
E[‖Xt+1 − x∗‖2 | Ft] +
∞∑
s=t+1
1{Ps 6=∅}
[
KAs +RBs +
V 2∗
2
Cs
]
≤ 1
2
‖Xt − x∗‖2 +
[
KAt +RBt +
V 2∗
2
Ct
]
· 1Pt 6=∅
+
∞∑
s=t+1
1{Ps 6=∅}
[
KAs +RBs +
V 2∗
2
Cs
]
=
1
2
E[‖Xt − x∗‖2 | Ft] +
∞∑
s=t
1{Ps 6=∅}
[
KAs +RBs +
V 2∗
2
Cs
]
= St (D.5)
i.e., St is a supermartingale (relative to Ft). Moreover, by taking expecations, we also get
E[St] = E[E[St | Ft−1]] ≤ E[St−1] ≤ . . . ≤ E[S1]
=
1
2
‖X1 − x∗‖2 + E
[
∞∑
s=1
[
KAs +RBs +
V 2∗
2
Cs
]
1{Ps 6=∅}
]
<∞
(D.6)
again by Lemma 2. This shows that St is (uniformly) bounded in L
1 so, by Doob’s submartin-
gale convergence theorem (Hall and Heyde, 1980, Theorem 2.5), we conclude that St con-
verges (a.s.) to some finite random variable S∞. In turn, this implies that limt→∞‖Xt−x∗‖
exists and is finite (a.s.), as claimed. 
Our second result (which is of independent interest) concerns the extraction of a subse-
quence of Xt converging to x∗.
Proposition D.2. With assumptions as in Theorem 2, there exists with probability 1 a (pos-
sibly random) subsequence Xtk of Xt such that limk→∞Xtk = x∗.
Proof. Suppose ad absurdum that the event
Ω0 = {lim inft→∞‖Xt − x∗‖ > 0} (D.7)
occurs with positive probability (i.e., with positive probability, Xt does not admit x∗ as a
limit point). Conditioning on this event, there exists a (nonempty) compact set C ⊂ X such
that x∗ /∈ C and Xt ∈ C for all sufficiently large t. Therefore, by the continuity of V and
the fact that the game satisfies (DSC), there exists some c > 0 such that
〈V (x), x − x∗〉 ≤ −c < 0 for all x ∈ C. (D.8)
To proceed, if we telescope (A.1) for p = x∗ and we use the decomposition (17) of Vˆt, we
get
1
2
‖Xt+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ 1
2
‖X1 − x∗‖2
+
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅}〈V (Xs), Xs − x∗〉
+
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅}
s−1∑
k=qs
〈V (Xk)− V (Xk+1), Xk − x∗〉
+
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅} ξqs+1 +
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅} rqs +
t∑
s=1
1{Ps 6=∅} γ
2
sψ
2
s (D.9)
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with ξqt+1, rqt and ψt defined respectively as in Lemmas A.1–A.3. Subsequently, letting
νt =
∑t
s=1 γs and
Qt =
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅}
s−1∑
k=qs
〈V (Xk)− V (Xk+1), Xk − x∗〉, (D.10)
the bound (D.8) yields
1
2
‖Xt+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ 1
2
‖X1 − x∗‖2 − cνt
+
[
Qt +
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅} ξqs+1 +
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅} rqs +
t∑
s=1
1{Ps 6=∅} γ
2
sψ
2
s
]
(D.11)
We now proceed term-by-term:
(1) For the term Qt, working as in the case of (C.3b) in the proof of Theorem 1, we
have:
Qt =
t∑
s=1
γs
s−1∑
k=qs
〈V (Xk)− V (Xk+1), Xk − x∗〉
≤
t∑
s=1
γs ·K
s−1∑
k=qs
γs
δs
≤ K
∞∑
s=1
As <∞, (D.12)
where At is defined as in (24) and, in the last step, we used Lemma 2.
(2) For the term involving ξ, let
Mt =
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅} ξqs+1. (D.13)
Since Pt is Ft-measurable, we have
E[Mt | Ft] = Mt−1 + γt 1{Pt 6=∅} E[ξqt+1 | Ft] = Mt−1, (D.14)
i.e., Mt is a martingale. Moreover, by the construction of the SPSA estimator (14)
and the decomposition (17) thereof, there exists some constant σ > 0 such that
‖Ut+1‖2 ≤ σ
2
δ2t
. (D.15)
We thus get:
E[M2t ] ≤
∞∑
s=1
1Ps 6=∅ γ
2
s E[ξ
2
qs+1 | Fs]
≤
∞∑
s=1
1Ps 6=∅ γ
2
s‖Xs − x∗‖2 E[‖Uqs+1‖2 | Fs]
≤
∞∑
s=1
γ2s‖Xs − x∗‖2 E[‖Uqs+1‖2 | Fs]
≤ diam(X )2σ2
∞∑
s=1
γ2s
δ2s
<∞ (D.16)
24 A. HÉLIOU, P. MERTIKOPOULOS, AND Z. ZHOU
Therefore, by the law of large numbers for martingale difference sequences (Hall and
Heyde, 1980, Theorem 2.18), we conclude thatMt/νt converges to 0 with probability
1 – and hence, with probability 1 conditioned on Ω0.
(3) For the second-to-last term in the brackets of (D.11), Lemma A.2 readily yields:
t∑
s=1
γs 1{Ps 6=∅} rqs ≤
∞∑
s=1
γsrqs ≤ R
∞∑
s=1
Bs <∞, (D.17)
where Bt is defined as in (24) and, in the last step, we used Lemma 2.
(4) Finaly, for the last term, we have:
t∑
s=1
1{Ps 6=∅} γ
2
sψ
2
s ≤
∞∑
s=1
γ2sψ
2
s ≤
V 2∗
2
∞∑
s=1
γ2s
δ2qs
(D.18)
where the last step follows from Lemma A.3. Subsequently, by Lemma 2, we have∑∞
s=1 γ
2
s/δ
2
qs <∞, so this term is also finite.
From the above, we conclude that, with probability 1 on Ω0 (and hence, with positive
probability overall), all the non-constant terms in the brackets of (D.11) converge to 0. In
turn, this implies that
‖Xt+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ‖X1 − x∗‖2 − |Θ(νt)| → −∞ as t→∞, (D.19)
a contradiction. Going back to our original assumption, this shows that, with probability 1,
Xt admits x∗ as a limit point, and our proof is complete. 
Putting all this together, the proof of Theorem 2 is relatively straightforward:
Proof of Theorem 2. Under the stated assumptions, ‖Xt−x∗‖ converges to some finite value
with probability 1. Given that Xt admits a subsequence converging to x∗ (a.s.), we conclude
that limt→∞‖Xt− x∗‖ = 0, again with probability 1. Finally, since δt is decreasing to 0, we
have
‖Xˆt − x∗‖2 = ‖Xt + δtWt − x∗‖2 ≤ 2‖Xt − x∗‖2 + 2δ2t ‖W‖2 → 0 (a.s.), (D.20)
i.e., the sequence of generated actions Xˆt converges to the game’s Nash equilibrium with
probability 1, as claimed. 
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